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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
R O B E R T B. H A N S E N , 
Plaintiff .Respondent 
and Cross-Appellant, 
vs. 
PETROF TRADING 
COMPANY, INC., 
Defendant-Appellant 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
AND CROSS APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE 
OF THE CASE 
Appellant's statement is incomplete in that it ne-
glected to state that the suit was for collection of an 
attorney's fee and that there is also a cross-appeal be-
cause the lower court based its judgment in favor of 
Respondent on the basis of $20.00 per hour rather than 
$25.00 per hour and because the judgment did not in-
clude any interest. 
Case No. 
13276 
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D I S P O S I T I O N OF T H E L O W E R COURT 
Appellant states that its Counter Claim was dis-
missed because it was filed beyond the period of the 
Statute of Limitations. In fact, however, the lower 
court dismissed the Counter Claim on two grounds, 
each of which was correct, and would sustain the trial 
court's judgment in this respect, namely (1) Appellant 
failed to prove or offer to prove facts sufficient to con-
stitute a claim upon which judgment could be rendered 
in its favor on its Counter Claim; (2) The acts com-
plained of were known or should have been known to 
the plaintiff more than four years prior to the filing of 
said Counter Claim (R. 128, Finding of Fact #6 ) . 
With respect to Respondent's Cross Appeal, Appel-
lant contends that interest was denied on the grounds 
that plaintiff failed to comply with the disclosure re-
quirements of the Consumer Credit Act and on the 
ground that interest was not included in the periodic 
billings to Appellant. In fact, however, the trial court 
denied interest on the principal sum found due by 
reason of the fact it found that there was "no express 
understanding with respect to the defendant being 
charged interest in connection with this case" (R. 128, 
Finding # 7 ) . 
R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L 
Respondent in his cross-appeal seeks to have the 
judgment granted in the lower court corrected by com-
putating the fee at $25.00 per hour and by allowing 
interest on the principal sum. 
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S T A T E M E N T OF FACTS 
Many, if not most, of the statements set forth in 
Appellant's Statement of Facts is the defendant's ver-
sion of what took place and much, if not most, of the 
so-called facts have no support in the record and it is 
therefore not surprising that Appellant has failed to 
comply with the provisions of Rule 75 P (2) with re-
spect to "giving reference to the pages of the record 
supporting such statements." 
As to the first paragraph, the first two sentences are 
correct, As to the third sentence the dismissal was to be 
predicted on a payment to be made in the future rather 
than one in the past and the order of dismissal was not 
made until the payment had been effected. As to the 
fourth and last statement it is not true that the represen-
tation of defendant's counsel (Keith Rooker) was faulty 
but it was discovered that even after the payment refer-
red to above the amount in dispute exceeded the Federal 
Court jurisdictional amount of $10,000.00 because the 
Appellant's claim was for more money than was prayed 
for in its complaint. 
The second and third paragraphs are correct. 
As to the fourth paragraph the so-called facts were 
not introduced in evidence as Appellant failed to offer 
to prove any facts which would have been sufficient to 
constitute a malpractice claim against Respondent. Had 
such proof been attempted, however, Respondent would 
have proved that all of his files in Case 116-67 were 
turned over to Attorney Arthur H . Nielsen before 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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said case went to trial in the Federal District Court 
and that the files contained all of the information with 
respect to the disposition referred to in Appellant's 
Brief. 
The fifth paragraph is correct. 
As to the sixth paragraph, it is not true that the 
Amended Reply to Counter Claim was received by 
Appellant's counsel less than one week before the trial 
of the matter as it was mailed in Salt Lake City, Utah, 
on August 28th, a Monday, and would have been re-
ceived by at least August 30th, which was more than 
seven days prior to the trial on September 7th and in 
any event there is no proof in the record that Appel-
lant's counsel had notice of less than a week's time and 
Appellant's counsel did not claim surprise at the trial 
nor did he move for a continuance if he felt that it 
would prejudice his case to have it heard on September 
7th as to was. 
As to the seventh paragraph this is correct except 
for the implication that Respondent was seeking to 
obtain judgment for a sum in excess of the correct 
amount as he had submitted corrected billing statement 
on which he sought judgment. Adjustment both up-
wards and downwards were made in the amount set 
forth on statements made in billing prior to the com-
mencement of this action. 
As to the eighth paragraph it is not correct that 
the court limited the purpose of Appellant's proffer 
of evidence to the question of determining whether the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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claim was barred by the Statute of Limitations. I t is 
true that the Court found that the Appellant should 
have discovered the acts upon which he did claim re-
spondent was liable. The Court not only found that 
the Appellant corporation should have discovered the 
acts of "alleged professional negligence" prior to Aug-
ust 19, 1972, but also more than four years prior to that 
date. The dismissal of the Counter Claim, however, was 
not grounded solely or even primarily on that basis 
as the Court first found that the proffer did not state 
a claim upon which relief could be granted (R. 128, 
Finding # 6 ) . 
As to the ninth paragraph the Court did not make 
the Finding set forth in the first sentence thereof and 
the denial of interest was not based thereon but upon 
the Court's finding that there was no express agreement 
on the part of the defendant to pay interest (R. 128, 
Finding # 7 ) . 
As to the tenth paragraph the Respondent did not 
accept the sum paid in satisfaction of judgment. On 
the contrary Respondent in its praecipe to the Sheriff of 
Salt Lake County expressly stated that it was not re-
ceiving any sum collected on the Execution issued on 
the Judgment as satisfaction. In any event these facts 
occurred subsequent to the Judgment appealed from 
and are not of record. 
The last paragraph is correct. 
Understandably the Appellant has not set forth 
the facts as they relate to Respondent's cross-appeal. 
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In fact, it ignores the cross-appeal except in its desig-
nation of the parties where it is correctly noted that 
Respondent is also the "Cross-Appellant". Since the 
facts regarding the cross-appeal are also the argument 
in support of the cross-appeal, they will be set forth 
under Point I I I to avoid undue repetition. 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
T H E T R I A L COURT D I S M I S S E D 
A P P E L L ANT'S C O U N T E R C L A I M 
BECAUSE A P P E L L A N T F A I L E D TO 
O F F E R P R O O F OF A N Y F A C T S ON 
W H I C H A J U D G M E N T F O R MAL-
P R A C T I C E COULD B E BASED. 
Appellant's counterclaim was dismissed primarily 
because appellant did not allege nor offer to prove any 
facts which would state a claim upon which relief could 
be granted (R. 128, Finding # 6 ) . The fact that the 
dismissal was also based upon the Statute of Limita-
tions does not nullify that fact and either ground alone 
is sufficient to justify the dismissal. 
P O I N T I I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY 
FOUND THAT THE LIMITATIONS 
WOULD BAR APPELLANT'S CLAIM 
AS A MATTER OF LAW BASED ON 
FACTS ASSERTED BY APPELLANT. 
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Respondent agrees with Appellant that the appli-
cable statute of limitations for professional malpractice 
cases against attorneys in Utah is the four year period 
set forth in Sec. 78-12-25 U.C.A. 1953 and Respondent 
also agrees that the party asserting that defense to a 
claim has the affirmative burden of pleading and prov-
ing it. Respondent disputes Appellant's claim, however, 
that the trial court shifted the burden to Appellant to 
prove that the Statute of Limitation did not apply. 
Respondent wishes to point out that Appellant fails 
to cite any part of the record in which the Court did 
as Appellant alleges in this regard. 
Respondent accepts the decisions of this Court in 
the case of Christiansen v. Bees, 20 U.2d 199, 436 P.2d 
435 (1968) and Holland v. Morton, 10 U.2d 390 353 
P.2d 989 (1960) as good law but wishes to point out 
that the facts in those cases are entirely different from 
the facts in this case, the basic distinction being that the 
conduct of malpractice in the case of the doctor and 
lawyer respectively in those cases was not known during 
the applicable limitation period whereas in this case it 
was known, assuming arguendo that there was in fact 
any acts of malpractice in the instant case, an assump-
tion which the Respondent vigorously denies and which 
denial was found to be correct in the trial court since 
Appellant's alleged facts in his Offer of Proof would 
not constitute a claim for malpractice even if they were 
true. The same is true with respect to the New York 
case of Wilson v. Econom § 6 Misc.2d 272, 288 N.Y. 
Supp. 2d 381 (1968). 
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This difference in facts is best highlighted by con-
trasting the situation in the instant case with what Ap-
pellant in its brief on page eleven says is true, "in most 
cases". There Appellant's brief reads as follows: "In 
most cases, an attorney has exclusive custody of records, 
evidence, research, and other pertinent materials to his 
client's case which are not usually available to others 
having the professional qualifications to determine 
whether an action of professional negligence has occur-
red." In this case Attorney Arthur H . Nielsen who 
tried the case which Respondent was initially employed 
in and who ultimately prevailed in the main in that case, 
was the one who had the exclusive custody of records, 
evidence, research, and pertinent materials to Respon-
dent's case and he certainly had and has the professional 
qualifications to determine whether an act of professional 
negligence had occurred. 
The Christiansen case stands for the proposition 
that it is for the trier of the facts, (here Judge Stewart 
M. Hanson who was sitting without a jury) to determine 
whether or not the patient knew or should have known 
that a foreign body was left in his body more than four 
years prior to the commencement of this action so that 
a Motion for Summary Judgment ought not to be 
granted. Here the Court's found that the Appellant 
knew or should have known of any of the acts complained 
of in his offer of proof more than four months prior to 
the filing of its Cross Claim (R. 128, Finding #6) and 
that Finding is amply supported by the evidence intro-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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duced in this case and particularly in light of Appel-
lant's offer of proof. (R. 270-277) 
Certainly, that case lends no support to the impli-
cation made in Appellant's Brief that the trial court is 
not entitled to make the factual determination that it 
did here without receiving the proffered evidence after 
receiving the Offer of Proof which it found insufficient 
to sustain Appellant's contention. In any event we are 
not left in doubt as to what that proof might have been 
even beyond the scope of the offer of proof as Appel-
lant's president has made a very extensive statement 
of what he contends to be the facts as set forth in his 
Affidavit in Appellant's Motion to open case, Take 
Testimony and Enter New Judgment under Rule 59, 
U.R.C.P. (R. 146-216). Without unduly burdening the 
Court with a detailed analysis of that Affidavit and 
why it fails to show that the Appellant asserted no 
claim upon which relief could be granted and that even 
if the alleged acts constituted malpractice that they were 
in fact known or should have been known more than 
four years prior to the filing of the Cross Claim, Re-
spondent will simply point out that Appellant's Brief 
failed to refer this Court to those allegations in that 11 
page Affidavit with 16 Exhibits attached upon which 
the lower Court could have found such malpractice 
and that its claim was presented within the time pro-
vided by law. 
As to the Holland case the plaintiff there based 
his claim on fraud and the main thrust of that case as 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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contended for by the Appellant here is that the client was 
entitled to trust in his attorney and was not charged 
with notice of a deed being recorded in the absence of 
his counsel advising him of this fact. The findings and 
Judgment of the court below in this case are not in any 
particular in conflict with that holding. 
In a proper case a defendant-appellant might well 
urge this Court to overrule its holding in the Christiansen 
case where its application might subject a professional 
to liability long after it would be fair to hold him answer-
able but that is not the case here as the Respondent is 
not urging that the termination rule be applied here in 
order to get off his prospective liability long before it 
would cease under the Christiansen discovery rule. 
P O I N T I I I 
T H E COURT E R R E D I N F I N D -
I N G T H A T T H E F E E A R R A N G E -
M E N T W A S $20.00 P E R H O U R W H E N 
A L L T H E E V I D E N C E I N T H E REC-
ORD E S T A B L I S H E D T H A T I T W A S 
$25.00 P E R HOUR. 
The facts in regard to this point are as follows: 
(1) On June 22, 1967 the Appellant paid the Respon-
dent $100.00 as a retainer on certain legal services and 
$25.00 in court costs (Exhibit 10-P, last page). (2) On 
December 23, 1967 the Respondent billed Appellant for 
$627.50, credited the $100.00 payment and requested 
payment of the balance of $527.50. (Exhibit 10-P, last 
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three pink sheets) Said statement stated that all of the 
services amounted to 25.1 hours. (3) On February 3, 
1968 the Respondent billed Appellant for $1,667.32 
(Exhibit 10-P, first two pink pages). On that bill it 
stated expressly that 31.1 hours were being billed at the 
rate of $25.00 per hour for services of the plaintiff 
personally and 23.3 hours for the services of David A. 
Goodwell, an associate of the plaintiff, at the rate of 
$15.00 per hour. (4) On January 5, 1968 the Respon-
dent paid the sum of $500.00 on account of the aforesaid 
services. (5) On June 1, 1970, Respondent billed Ap-
pellant for $2,178.12 for 34.85 additional hours and 
based that billing at the rate of $25.00 per hour (see 
Exhibit 10-P, last gold page). (6) No payment was 
made pursuant to that statement and on July 31, 1970 
the Respondent filed suit for payment of the said 
$2,178.12 together with interest thereon at the rate of 
6% per annum from various dates when parts of the 
billings were due and unpaid. (R-l) On December 7, 
1970 the Respondent expressly admitted in his Answer 
that the amount of compensation which the Appellant 
agreed to pay Respondent for the aforesaid legal ser-
vices was $25.00 per hour for services performed by 
Respondent personally and $15.00 per hour for services 
performed by David A. Goodwill (R-5, paragraph 
one). On December 7, 1971 the Appellant filed an 
Answer in which he denied the basis of conmpensation 
alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint (R-20, Second De-
fense) (7) On the 16th day of October, 1971 the Respon-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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dent served a Request for Admissions on Appellant 
which requested that he admit that "the initial fee 
arrangement obligated the defendant to pay plain-
tiff $25.00 per hour for services rendered by him 
in connection with the aforesaid law suit". (R-8) 
(8) On December 15, 1971 Respondent through 
its attorney admitted said Request for Admission 
(R-30, #8) (9) On October 16, 1971 the Re-
spondent served on Appellant the following written 
Interrogatory: "State what the basis of the compensa-
tion to the plaintiff was according to the initial agree-
ment and any subsequent modification for services 
rendered by the plaintiff and by his associate, David A. 
Goodwell." (R-10, #2) On December 15, 1971, the 
Respondent answered that Interrogatory as follows: 
"$25.00 for services rendered by plaintiff, $15.00 for 
services of David A. Goodwell. See answers above for 
further explanation." (R-32, #2) (10) Previous to all 
of the foregoing transactions, the Respondent had offer-
ed on July 26, 1965, to render services for the Appel-
lant for the sum of $20.00 per hour (E. 2-P) and it 
was on the basis of this letter that the trial court based its 
judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the de-
fendant (R-127, #1) (11) In explaining Ex. 2-P at 
trial the Respondent pointed out that he had increased 
his hourly charges from $20.00 per hour to $25.00 per 
hour sometime after July 26, 1965, and prior to the time 
that the services in question were undertaken. In support 
of that explanation Respondent offered a copy of a 
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billing to the Appellant dated Feb. 13, 1967, which 
showed that he had billed respondent $25.00 per hour 
for services in December, 1966 and January 1967. That 
exhibit also referred to a letter to Attorney Lewis F . 
Sherman, which is Exh. 7-P which also showed that the 
billing was being made on the basis of $25.00 per hour. 
The respondent paid both charges by paying Respon-
dent the sum of $193.62 prior to the Appellant employ-
ing the Respondent to perform the services which are 
the subject matter of this law suit. (Ex. 8-P, R. 242) 
P O I N T IV 
T H E COURT E R R E D I N NOT 
A L L O W I N G I N T E R E S T ON T H E 
P R I N C I P A L SUM F O U N D TO BE 
O W I N G FROM A P P E L L A N T TO RE-
S P O N D E N T . 
The trial court, as noted in the Statement of Facts, 
denied Respondent interest on the basis that there was 
no express agreement that interest would be charged 
if payment was not made upon receipt of billings (R-
128, # 7 ) . Respondent respectfully submits that there 
is no legal authority which would justify the denial of 
interest on that basis and Appellant apparently con-
cedes this to be the case as it seeks to justify the denial 
of interest on some vague reference to the Consumer 
Credit Code. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
Sec. 15-1-1 U.C.A. 1953 provides, inter alia: "The 
legal rate of interest for the loan or forebearance of any 
money good or things in action shall be 6% per annum." 
There was no loan here but there certainly was fore-
bearance. 
In Godbe v. Young, 15Ut. 55; 15 Wall 562." 
(1890) this court said on page 60: "When interest, as 
such, should be allowed by courts as a matter of law, 
and when it may be allowed as damages by juries in 
descretion are questions that have been much discussed 
by courts and commentators. We are satisfied, however, 
that in regard to the first of these questions, the rule 
most firmly found on record, and reason, and best sup-
ported by authority is, 'that in actions of contract in-
terest is no longer in the discretion of the jury, but a 
matter of right and as essential to legal indemnity as 
the principal sum or ascertained value to which it is 
instant.' (Sedgwick on Damages, 5th Edition, 432, note 
2 and citing nine cases from New York and elsewhere 
in support thereof.) Here, of course, this was an action 
based on an oral contract and hence the interest should 
have been accorded to the Respondent as a matter of 
right and of law. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully urges this Court to remand 
this case to the lower Court with instructions to amend 
the Findings to show that the hourly rate for the judg-
ment should be $25.00 per hour rather than $20.00 per 
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hour and that interest is due to the Respondent on the 
principal sum at the rate of 6% per annum even though 
there was no express agreement with respect to interest 
and that the judgment should be amended accordingly 
and that this Court should affirm the trial Court's dis-
missal of Appellant's Counter Claim on either the merits 
or on the bar of the limitations of actions or on both. 
Respectfully submitted, 
R O B E R T B. H A N S E N 
Respondent 
838 18th Avenue 
Salt Lake iCty, Utah 
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